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We present an analysis of the price impact associated with trades effected by different financial
firms. Using data from the Spanish Stock Market, we find a high degree of heterogeneity across
different market members, both in the instantaneous impact functions and in the time-dependent
market response to trades by individual members. This heterogeneity is statistically incompatible
with the existence of market-wide universal impact dynamics which apply uniformly to all trades and
suggests that rather, market dynamics emerge from the complex interaction of different behaviors of
market participants. Several possible reasons for this are discussed, along with potential extensions
one may consider to increase the range of applicability of existing models of market impact.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.-k, 05.10.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of financial markets presents re-
searchers with an intricate complexity, involving phe-
nomena such as stochastic processes with long-range
correlation, scaling and hetereogeneity [1–3, 7, 8, 22].
Traditionally, the study and modeling of financial
markets in the physics community has focused on
two different approaches, the development of agent-
based models and the analysis of real-world market
data. Data analysis here mostly aims at describing
properties such as price fluctuations, market impact
and correlations, and up to now has mostly been car-
ried out at the macroscopic level of the market as a
whole, i.e. without distinguishing between individual
members or classes of members acting on the market.
Recent research has shown however that the trad-
ing strategies employed by individual traders can be
quantitatively different [8]. Also, different markets,
while sharing some ‘universal properties’, can exhibit
different statistical features. One may therefore ask
what properties found in different markets are inher-
ent to the (top-down) mechanisms and regulations by
which particular markets are run, so that they apply
to all participants, and which of the observed proper-
ties instead are self-generated bottom-up and emerge
from the complex interaction of a pool of different be-
haviors on the level of the market participants? That
is, which of the observed properties of the market
apply to all participants and what observations are
instead of an effective nature, representing a – possi-
bly complex – average of actions by an ensemble of
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heterogeneous actors? The answer to these questions
would shed some light on the connection between the
microscopic nature of the agents participating in the
market and the macroscopic behavior of the market,
a topic of high interest in the physics community [1].
Although the evidence for heterogeneous behavior
of market participants (i.e. trader-specific strategies)
has been found even at large time scales [8], recent
research has focused on the impact of different trad-
ing strategies on the price at very short scales and at
the level of the order-book [11]. The availability of
high-frequency data for different markets has made it
possible to find and investigate statistical regularities
of market dynamics and to address the mechanism
by which prices are formed. One of the most active
areas focuses on the question how financial markets
respond to a given order or to a flow of orders. For
example it has been shown that there is a concave re-
lationship between the size of an incoming order, V ,
and the resulting average market impact, I(V ), both
for individual orders [4, 6, 30] or large (hidden) orders
[14, 33, 34]. Although a number of theoretical models
based on brokers’ trading strategies [26, 27] informa-
tion efficiency [29] or the linear supply/demand book
profile [32] propose that I(V ) ∼ V α with α = 1/2
(the so-called ‘square-root law’) the data from differ-
ent markets, stocks and other financial products has
revealed that the exponent α can vary in a wide range
α ∈ [0, 1], see for example [2–4, 6, 9, 19–21]. The
precise reasons for this variation are as yet not fully
understood, making the current understanding of in-
stantaneous market impact incomplete to a certain
extent. Another intriguing result is the observation
of long-range correlations in the order flow [6, 17, 18],
while at the same time prices are seen to be close to
unpredictable and market efficiency is conserved to a
high degree. This presents researchers with an appar-
ent paradox, long-range correlations in some proper-
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2ties on the one hand, and lack of predictability on the
other. One proposed solution is based on the sugges-
tion of a delicate manner in which orders are slowly
digested by markets through fine-tuned adjustments
in the liquidity [3]. However, it is still unclear what
the precise process is which produces this delicate
balance between order flow and liquidity fluctuations
and, additionally, whether this balance holds for in-
dividual participants or whether it is a macro-scale
result of the interaction between different market par-
ticipants as suggested in [11].
Until recently, investigating the effect of hetero-
geneity in the microstructure formation of the price
was prevented by the anonymity of the financial
databases. However, recent studies have had access
to the individual activity of market members in the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Spanish Stock
Exchange (SSE) [11, 14]. A qualification of the term
‘market member’ is here in order. Throughout this
paper we will use the words trader, firm and mar-
ket member synonymously, they all refer to individ-
ual membership codes registered at the market. The
actions of a market member in the sense of the cur-
rent work therefore do not represent the decisions of
a single person, but instead some level of aggregation
is implied. Market members act not only on behalf of
themselves, but also on behalf of many of their clients,
who in themselves form a heterogeneous group. De-
spite this coarse graining, significant variation and
patterns have been found in the trading strategies of
different market members, their placement of hidden
orders, and in the herding behaviour of market mem-
bers [7, 8]. In the present paper we study how dif-
ferent market members impact prices and how their
flow of orders is incorporated in price fluctuations.
Specifically we address these questions using a four-
year high-frequency dataset from the Spanish Stock
Market. This dataset will be described in more detail
in Sec. II, before we focus on instantaneous impact
in Sec. III. Time-dependent impact (i.e. response
functions) will be studied in Sec. IV before we draw
conclusions in Sec. V. Details of the numerical pro-
cedures by which we have processed the raw data un-
deryling our work are discussed in the Appendix.
II. DATA SET
Our database comes from the Sistema de Inter-
conexio´n Bursa´til Electro´nico (SIBE). This is the
electronic open market at the Spanish Stock Ex-
change. The dataset contains all market orders
placed by financial firms from 2001 to 2004 along
with an identity number for the firms involved in each
transaction. The existing analysis of datasets from a
variety of markets and stocks has revealed that price
impact functions can depend on the features of the
stock being traded [4]. We here examine four highly
Stock N #ID 〈s〉 〈∆〉 〈V 〉 αM
TEF 4.27M 49 0.000951 15.76 7778.99 0.25± 0.01
SAN 3.03M 46 0.00140 12.26 5413.71 0.26± 0.01
BBVA 2.61M 39 0.00109 16.98 5934.18 0.19± 0.02
REP 1.63M 28 0.00102 18.55 5140.38 0.16± 0.02
TABLE I: Summary of the properties of the data used
in the study. Here N is the number of transactions in
the processed dataset involving the given stock, #ID la-
bels represents the number of market members triggering
transactions on the stock (we only consider members with
more than 104 trades for each stock), 〈s〉 is the average
spread, 〈∆〉 is the average instantaneous impact (in bps
of the spread) and 〈V 〉 is the average size of the order
measured in Euros. The quantity αM is the exponent ob-
tained from fitting the global market impact function to
a power law (see text for details).
capitalized stocks: Telefo´nica (TEF), Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Banco Santander Cen-
tral Hispano (SAN) and Repsol (REP). To minimize
statistical fluctuations of market impact, we aggre-
gate the four different years, resulting in 4 distinct
sets of data, one for each stock. For each of these
we consider only the most active firms, namely those
which have traded at least 104 times in a given stock
in the whole period. Some properties of these data
sets are summarised in Table I. Each of the 4 sets
contains more than 1 million trades and the typical
size of transaction is of the order of 104 Euros.
If in the actual trading process a firm places a
market order for M shares, this order may trigger
a sequence of transactions, in which the firm is buy-
ing from (or selling to) multiple different firms who
are all contributing to the available liquidity at the
best price. We chose to process the data so that oc-
currences such as these are represented as one single
transaction that the triggering firm intended to make.
We also combine potential multiple trades triggered
by the same firm at one single time stamp (i.e. within
one second) into a single trade whose volume is the
sum of the individual transactions. An example of
this processing is shown in the Appendix. A simi-
lar procedure is performed by Bouchaud et al in [6].
There are also events, such as the cancellation of limit
orders, which are not shown in the data. However,
these events can still affect the price leading to an ap-
parent mismatch between the type of trade triggered
and the subsequent movement in price, e.g. a ‘buy’
market order may be triggered at the same time as
the cancellation of a larger ‘buy’ limit order, causing
the price to drop overall. Events like these account
for less than 2% of all trades, and are disregarded in
our analysis.
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FIG. 1: Instantaneous price impact as a function of the
volume (in Euros) of the market order. Black circles show
the result for the whole-market impact function for TEF
(taking account all data from 2001-2004), and can be fit-
ted to the power law ∆ ∼ V α with α = 0.25±0.01 (dashed
line indicates this exponent). The remaining curves show
the instantaneous price impact functions Ii/σ for 4 differ-
ent firms. The dottes lines indicate the values of V0 and
∆0 (see text).
III. INSTANTANEOUS MARKET IMPACT
A. Definitions
In this section we first focus on instantaneous ef-
fects of trades on the market price. This instanta-
neous price impact caused by a particular trade is
the difference in the price of the stock immediately
before and after the trade. By price, we mean the log
mid-price or quote
qt =
ln at + ln bt
2
, (1)
where at and bt are the best ask and best bid at time
t. Here t is measured in units of trades (the so-called
tick time), to minimize the effects of time-varying
trading patterns resulting in non-homogeneous distri-
bution of trades over time. Following [5] we define the
conditional market impact function (in basic points,
bps, of the spread) as
∆(V ) = I(V )/σ = 〈(q+t − q−t ) εt
∣∣V 〉/σ (2)
where q+t and q
−
t are the quotes right after and before
the the trade at time t and 〈. . .〉 denotes an average
over t. We have used σ = 〈s〉/100, where 〈s〉 is the
average spread for the stock. The variable ε = ±1
is the so-called ‘order indicator’, it is equal to +1 if
the trader who triggered the trade is buying, it takes
the value −1 if the triggering trader is selling. Mul-
tiplying by ε ensures that the instantaneous impact,
εt(q
+
t − q−t ), is always positive for any given trade.
The notation 〈· · · |V 〉 in Eq. (2) denotes an condi-
tional average of the price impact on a given trading
volume V . Trading volume is here measured in to-
tal money, instead of the number of stocks traded.
This is to take into account that prices can change
substantially during the long time period considered
here, and thus a given number of stocks does not cor-
respond to the same amount of money throughout
the dataset. As part of our analysis we will consider
the global market impact, i.e. impact without differ-
entiation between the individual traders. In this case
expression (2) is computed for the market as a whole.
Results are then labeled by a subscript M , i.e. we
will write ∆M (V ) or IM (V ). In cases where we focus
on the impact of individual traders, only transactions
triggered by the trader under investigation are taken
into account when computing the RHS of Eq. (2) and
we indicate impact functions of individual firms with
an index i in our notation, i.e. ∆i(V ) or Ii(V ).
B. Global instantaneous market impact
The impact on the price generally increases with
volume as trades move deeper into the order book.
In previous studies the shape of global market im-
pact functions has been reported as either logarith-
mic behaviour, ∆M (V ) ∼ lnV [9] or as a power law,
∆M (V ) ∼ V αM , with small exponents αM ≈ 0.1−0.5
[4]. Results of a cumulative analysis of our data, tak-
ing into account all transactions for a given stock, is
shown in Fig. 1 and Table I. For example, for TEF the
resulting global impact curve admits a fit to a power
law with an exponent of αM ≈ 0.25±0.01. This value
is very close to the ones found in LSE [30].
C. Individual instantaneous market impact
We now move on the study the heterogeneity of im-
pact functions of individual traders, i.e. we consider
the impact functions Ii(V ) of individual firms. Re-
sults for a set of firms, taking into account trades in
the TEF dataset, are shown in Fig. 1. A considerable
variation in the shape of impact functions is found,
with some traders displaying even a decreasing im-
pact with volume. To quantify this variation, we fit
each individual price impact to the functional form
∆i(V ) = ciV
αi , (3)
where, as before, the subscript i stands for the ID
of an individual firm (membership code). The re-
sulting exponents αi are found to lie the range αi ∈
[−0.6, 0.6] for the different stocks (see Fig. 2). In
order to demonstrate that this large variability is
not due to statistical fluctuations around the market
value, we compare the values of the fitted exponents
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FIG. 2: The left-hand panel shows the exponents αi for
the different firms i as a function of their market partic-
ipation ratio pii. The solid red line is αM , the grey area
indicates one standard deviation from that value, as ob-
tained by shuffling firm codes in the database (see text
for details). The dashed line is the weighted average, α,
of the αi. The right hand panel shows the relationship
between the parameters αi and ci (see text). The solid
line corresponds to the prediction of ciV
αi
0 = ∆0, with
∆0 = 40 bps and V0 = 60000 Euros.
αi with those obtained shuffling the firm’s ID codes
in the database (see again Fig. 2). More precisely,
in this permutation procedure we assign a randomly
chosen triggering membership ID to each transaction
in the database, while preserving the overall statis-
tics of participation ratios (measured in fraction of
market orders in the database, see also [14]). The
resulting individual-level impact curves are again fit-
ted to power-laws, we will denote the corresponding
exponents by α′i in the following. When this permu-
tation is applied we obtain α′i ' αM for most mem-
bers i. The distribution of α′i is centred around αM ,
with a small standard deviation, shown in Fig. 2 as
a shaded band. Most of the actual exponents αi (ob-
tained from the data without applying the shuffling)
are not within this band, confirming that the spread
of the αi is not merely a sampling effect.
One might speculate whether the market impact
function is determined by a small set of big firms
with high participation ratio pii ' 1 and αi ' αM .
However, as we see in Fig. 2 most of the participation
ratios are small (in line with what is observed in [12])
and firms with moderate pii have values of αi different
from αM .
The price impact function is a measure of how
much the price moves after trades of a given vol-
ume V . These movements in price generally result
in additional costs to the triggering firms. Hence,
the variation seen in the impact curves can be in-
terpreted as representing different trading strategies
used by firms to manage these costs. Controlling
market impact constitutes an element of their over-
all trading strategy. In this picture, the market-level
impact curve emerges as a convoluted and weighted
average of the impact curves of individual firms. If
this is indeed the case then different combinations
of firm-level trading strategies operated in different
market places and for different stocks might explain
the variation in the market-level exponents αM ob-
served in different markets [2–4, 6, 9, 19–21]. Even
though the relationship between the impact curves of
individual market members and that of the market
as a whole, i.e. the relation between the collection of
{αi} and αM , is non-trivial, a more detailed analysis
across four different stocks in our dataset reveals a
strong correlation (ρ = 0.97) between the weighted
average α =
∑
i piiαi and the market value αM . This
reinforces the idea that the market impact function
depends on the composition of the pool of strategies
operating at the market, and on the weights of the
different firm-level impact strategies.
Despite the large variability seen in the individual
price impact functions we find that most firms do
share a common behavior for large volumes V : in-
dividual impact functions converge to a given value
of the impact ∆i ' ∆0 for large volumes Vi ' V0.
As shown in Fig. 1 in the case of TEF this happens
around V0 = 60, 000 Euros at an impact ∆0 = 40 bps
of the spread. An explanation of this phenomenon
is the observation that for large values of V the or-
der always impacts the price by moving it to the first
tick (one cent of Euro). In our database, a tick move-
ment in the price corresponds to 45 bps of the spread
for TEF (similar values for the other stocks) which
is very close to the observed behavior. This common
feature of the individual market impact functions re-
sults in a constraint on the coefficients ci and the
exponents αi in Eq. (3). These two parameters are
no longer independent degrees of freedom of a firm’s
impact strategy. In fact, assuming that ∆i(V0) = ∆0
for all i one has ciV
αi
0 = ∆0, resulting in the relation
ln ci + αi lnV0 = ln ∆0, which is accurately followed,
as shown in Fig. 2.
We have now established that the individual mar-
ket impact functions ∆i(V ) vary across different
firms. This is however not the only element deter-
mining the average market impact (i.e. the average
cost) for a given market participant. Instead these
costs also depend on the distribution of the volumes
of orders effected by a given trader. Thus, it might be
that the trading strategy of market member i (essen-
tially set by αi) and the distribution of order volumes
for firm i, Pi(V ), are chosen in combination to min-
imize total average cost. To investigate this possible
relationship between impact and distribution of vol-
umes, we point out that the average market impact
51
1
TEF
SAN
BBVA
REP
10 100
10
100
￿∆
i￿
/
￿∆
M
￿
￿Vi￿ / ￿VM ￿
￿∆i￿
∆˜i
FIG. 3: The average impact of each trader plotted against
their average traded volume for all data sets (black cir-
cles). To allow better comparison between data sets the
values obtained for each trader are scaled by the average
values for their stock. The dashed line is a power law fit
to the data with an exponent of 0.68 ± 0.05. The inset
demonstrates the validity of Eq. (6).
is given by
〈∆i〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dV∆i(V )Pi(V ), (4)
where Pi(V ) denotes the distribution of volumes at
which firm i places orders. As shown in Fig. 4 we
find that for most of the firms, the distribution Pi(V )
scales like
Pi(V ) = P(V/〈Vi〉), (5)
where 〈Vi〉 is the average order volume for firm i and
where P(x) can be fitted to the form P(x) = a/(b+
x)γ . We find the numerical value γ = 2.95± 0.01 for
TEF for the associated exponent, this is similar to the
one reported for large hidden orders using the same
data [7]. Note that the observed exponent differs from
the usual 5/2-exponent found in the distribution of
volumes for single orders [35]. This is due to the fact
that we measure order size in money, instead of the
number of stocks, as was done in [7]. Inserting the
above functional form of Pi(V ) in Eq. (4) and using
ansatz ∆i(V ) = ciV
αi for the impact functions of
individual firms we obtain
〈∆i〉 = ∆˜i ≡ ci〈Vi〉αiF(αi, γ), (6)
where
F(αi, γ) = (γ − 2)αi Γ(1 + αi)Γ(γ − αi − 1)
Γ(γ − 1) . (7)
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FIG. 4: Individual normalized distribution of volumes
per order Pi(V/〈Vi〉) for each agent in TEF (gray lines).
Open symbols identify the agents depicted in Fig. 1, while
black circles are the result for the whole market. The
result of fitting the distribution of V/〈Vi〉 from all data
sets together to the functional form in P(x) = a/(b+ x)γ
with γ = 2.95 is shown in the inset.
Here Γ(·) stands for the standard Gamma function.
We have here written ∆˜i for the results of the theoret-
ical considerations based on the shape of individual-
level impact functions and individual-level volume
distributions. Eq. (6) relates the average impact of
a given firm to the parameters of the firm’s price im-
pact function and the average size of the firm’s or-
ders. A number of approximations have been made
to reach Eq. (6). Nevertheless, as shown in the inset
of Fig. 3, the obtained expression for ∆˜i reproduces
the observed values of 〈∆i〉 with high accuracy. Since
the coefficient ci can be obtained if αi is known (see
above), Eq. (6) shows that the average impact of firm
i is a function of αi and 〈Vi〉 only. If all αi ' αM
then we would have obtained that 〈∆i〉 ∼ 〈Vi〉αM ,
the characteristic values of αM for the four different
stocks in our dataset are given in Table I, varying
in the range αM = 0.16, ..., 0.25. In contrast Fig. 3
shows that 〈∆i〉 ∼ 〈Vi〉0.68±0.05, i.e. one finds a much
larger exponent. Given that the weighted average of
firm-level exponents αi is close to the market value
αM , this increased exponent is most likely due to ad-
ditional correlations between αi and 〈Vi〉.
IV. RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
The price impact of a trade is not restricted to the
instantaneous effect. There will be some response
over time to the information contained in a trade.
This leads us to look at the price impact l tick time
6steps after the trade is executed at tick time t. The
relationship between tick time and real time varies
for different stocks and different years but typically
100 ticks equates to approximately 10 minutes. This
delayed impact is given by
RM (l, V ) = 〈(q+t+l − q−t ) εt
∣∣V 〉/σ. (8)
Note that RM (l = 0, V ) ≡ ∆M (V ). Since the quote
after a delay l can be affected by other trades be-
tween t and t + l, the response at this time can be
positive or negative (relative to the sign of the ini-
tial trade). The analysis of data from markets other
than the Spanish Stock Market has shown that the
volume-dependent response function can often be fac-
torized as R(l, V ) ≈ ∆(V )R(l) [6], where ∆(V ) is the
instantaneous market impact function. A similar re-
lation also holds for the Spanish market, and allows
us to restrict our attention to the response function
given by
RM (l) = 〈(q+t+l − q−t ) εt〉/σ, (9)
which does not depend on V . This is the average
response at time t + l to a trade at time t regard-
less of the volume of the trade and regardless of the
trader who triggered the initial trade. We will refer
to RM (l) as the global market response function. As
with the instantaneous impact we can also examine
response functions for individual agents by consider-
ing the average impact l ticks after a trade triggered
by a particular firm, i:
Ri(l) = 〈(q+t+l − q−t ) εt| t ∈ Si〉/σ, (10)
where Si is the set of all times with trades initiated
by firm i. As before 〈. . .〉 denotes an average over
tick time t, subject to appropriate constraints (e.g.
t ∈ Si).
Resulting individual response functions for TEF
are shown in Fig. 5b). As seen in the figure the
response functions on the individual level are sta-
tistically different from RM (l) and show a large de-
gree of heterogeneity. Nevertheless both the market
and most traders’ response functions appear to either
level off at large time lags l, or to become negative for
very large l, no divergences are observed, similar to
what is reported for other markets [3, 11] for differ-
ent stocks. As expected we also recover the fact that
RM (l) =
∑
i piiRi(l), indicating that the observed fi-
nite response in the market results from the average
of finite responses at the firm-level.
The finite response for the market and the individ-
uals may appear surprising at first, as the the trading
behaviour of agents and the market is typically seen
to display long-range correlations [6, 17, 18]. For the
market, these correlations are quantified in terms of
CM (l) = 〈εtεt+l〉. (11)
As an example we have computed CM (l) for the
set of all trades in TEF, and as seen in Fig. 5a)
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FIG. 5: Panel a) Correlation function of sign of the orders
for the market (black line) and a set of different firms
(color lines) for TEF. Grey shaded area is one standard
deviation around the average value obtained from shuffled
data. Dashed line is the weighted average
∑
i piiCi(l).
The inset shows the fit of CM (l) (black line) to the power
law CM (l) ∼ l−0.21 (dashed line). Panel b) Response
function R(l) for the market and a set of different firms.
Color codes and line types correspond to those in a).
the correlation function exhibits a slow power-law
decay, CM (l) ∼ l−γ , at long times with γTEF =
0.212 ± 0.001. For the other stocks we get that
γSAN = 0.183 ± 0.001, γBBV A = 0.329 ± 0.002 and
γREP = 0.257±0.003. This indicates that, similar to
what has been seen in other markets, the order flow
is a long-memory process, i.e. 0 < γ < 1. In order
to address the apparent contradiction between long-
range correlation in trade signs, and finite response
at the firm-level it is important to realize that Eq.
(10) represents the response of the whole market to
trades by an individual firm. Hence it is important
to consider how the trade signs of the whole market
are correlated with the trade signs of a given firm.
Specifically we define the correlation function
Ci(l) = 〈εtεt+l| t ∈ Si〉 , (12)
where the trade at time t is initiated by firm i, and
where the later transaction at time t+ l can be trig-
gered by any trader. Nevertheless, we find that at
large l the correlation of the market trade signs with
that of a single firm is essentially dominated by cor-
relations of the firm with itself.
Similar to what is observed in the response func-
tions, the obtained correlation functions Ci(l) exhibit
a significant degree of variation, see Fig. 5a). In par-
ticular we find that the functional form for Ci(l) can
differ significantly from that of CM (l). This might
be due to the different ways in which participants
execute large orders over time [10]. However, by def-
inition, we must recover CM (l) =
∑
i piiCi(l). Thus,
the functional form of CM (l) ∼ l−γ results from the
pool of correlation functions exhibited by the individ-
7ual firms. The market-level exponent γ is, in this pic-
ture, a (convoluted) function of the different shapes of
correlation functions of the individual market mem-
bers which might explain the large heterogeneity of
the exponent found across markets and stocks [3]
The apparent inconsistency between long-range
correlation in the traders’ behaviour on the one hand,
but finite long-time response on the other hand has
triggered several different modeling attempts [3, 5, 6].
In the model of Bouchaud et al [6] market impact is
assumed to be temporary. Mid-quote prices are then
written as
qt =
∑
t′<t
G0(t− t′)It′εt′ +
∑
t′<t
ηt′ , (13)
where G0(·) is a so-called ‘bare’ impact function,
propagating the effects of a single trade forward in
time. The variables ηt represent noise, assumed to be
uncorrelated with the trade signs, and It is the (un-
signed) instantaneous impact at time t. Substituting
Eq. (13) into the definition of the response function,
Eq. (9), one finds
RM (l) = RM (0)G0(l)
+RM (0)
∑
0<l′<l
G0(l − l′)CM (l)
+RM (0)
∑
l′>0
[G0(l + l
′)−G0(l′)]CM (l′),
(14)
where we have assumed that 〈Itεtεt+l〉 = 〈It〉 〈εtεt+l〉
and where we have used 〈It〉 = RM (0). Given the
long-range nature of correlations in the order flow and
the unpredictabilty of prices (i.e. the finiteness of re-
sponse functions at long times) the shape of the bare
propagator G0(·) is severly restricted in the model of
[6]. Since CM (l) decays as a power law (see Fig. 5a)
the bare impact function was assumed to be of the
form
G0(l) =
Γ0
(l20 + l
2)β/2
, (15)
where Γ0, l0 and β are constants. The key finding of
[6] is that the exponent β requires fine tuning so as to
ensure finite response at long times. The critical value
of β necessary to achieve this is given by βc =
1−γ
2 .
The validity of these hypotheses can be tested in
our dataset. We insert the response function RM (l)
and the correlation function CM (l), as obtained from
the data into Eq. (14) and then subsequently invert it
to get G0(l). Results for TEF are shown in Fig. 6, and
we find βTEF = 0.375 ± 0.001 which is indeed very
close to the critical value βc = 0.394 which one would
derive from the exponent γTEF = 0.212 obtained
from the correlation function. For the other stocks we
get similar agreement for SAN, βSAN = 0.409±0.001
(βc = 0.408), but a moderate deviation for the other
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FIG. 6: The G0(l) calculated from inverting Eq. (14)
(solid line) and a fit to the form given in Eq. (15) over the
first 2000 points (dashed line). Data is from TEF. The
parameters of the fit are Γ0 = 3.5± 0.03, l0 = 21.3± 0.3
and β = 0.375± 0.001.
two stocks: βBBV A = 0.255± 0.001 (βc = 0.336) and
βREP = 0.296± 0.001 (βc = 0.3715).
We next investigate whether a model similar to
that of [6] can be devised to relate market impact
and correlation on the level of individual traders.
The hypothesis we want to test is whether Eq. (13),
with the bare impact function obtained on the market
level, is able to capture how the market digests orders
placed by individual firms. To this end we substitute
Eq. (13) into Eq. (10) and obtain
Ri(l) = Ri(0)G0(l) +RM (0)
∑
0<l′<l
G0(l − l′)Ci(l)
+ RM (0)
∑
l′>0
[G0(l + l
′)−G0(l′)]Ci(l′), (16)
with Ci(l) as defined in Eq. (12). Thus, within the
model of Eq. (13), any observed difference between
the response functions of different firms is expected
only to result from the different shapes of their cor-
relation functions Ci(l) – the ‘bare’ impact function
is the same for all traders in this approach. More-
over, the unique G0(l) (applicable to all traders) and
the linearity of the model ensure that we recover Eq
(14) by summing Eqs. (16) over all firms, weighted
appropriately by their participation ratios pii.
In principle, the most straightforward way to test
the validity of Eq. (16) for each trader i may seem
to be to compute the response and correlation func-
tions Ri and Ci from the data and to invert Eq. (16)
for each agent, solving for G0(·), and then to com-
pare the resulting bare impact functions. This would
then allow to decide whether the bare propagator
can be assumed to be of a global nature, applying to
all traders, or whether the market digests trades by
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FIG. 7: Panel a) shows the average of the cost ki as a
function of the area of the correlation function for the real
∆i(l) (black circles) and for the reconstructed response
functions using Eq. (16) (red quares). Panel b) depicts
the average instantaneous market impact as a function of
the area of the correlation function for different firms and
stocks.
different firms differently, resulting in trader-specific
kernels G0,i. While we have attempted this, no sta-
tistically significant statements about the existence
of a global kernel or otherwise are possible from our
dataset.
Some indirect evidence regarding the validity of
Eq. (16) is shown in Fig. 7a) however. From the data
we have computed the average cost of a uniform trad-
ing strategy per firm:
κi =
1
L
L∑
i=1
Ri(l). (17)
and compared it with the area under the correlation
function χi =
∑L
i=1 Ci(l), which is a decreasing func-
tion of the exponent γi if we assume Ci(l) ∼ l−γi .
In our calculations we used L = 1000. The predic-
tion from Eq. (16) is that Ri(l) ∼ l1−βM−γi [6] and
then those firms with larger χi (smaller γi) should
have larger costs κi: indeed this is what we find in
Fig. 7a) when we use Eq. (16) to reconstruct Ri(l)
from the market bare impact function G0,M (l) and
the individual Ri(0) and Ci(l). However, the real
data from direct measurements of κi and χi shows
precisely the opposite behavior: the larger χi the
smaller the cost κi, which means that firms which
have a more correlated order flow do have less tem-
poral market impact than those which are short-time
correlated. This can also be seen in Fig. 5, where we
show Ci(l) and Ri(l) for a given set of firms. These
observations imply that the model of Eq. (13) and
the assumptions made to reach Eqs. (14) and (16)
are presumably too simplistic to accommodate the
observed behavior. Market impact on the level of in-
dividual traders does not appear to be propagated
through a global impact function G0(l), applicable
to all traders, and particular, the heterogeneity seen
in the response functions are not soley the result of
the heterogeneity seen in Ci(l). Instead we conclude
that heterogeneities both in Ci(l) and in the trader-
specific propagator contribute to the variation seen
in individual-level response functions.
This counterintuitive behavior implies that there is
a more intricate connection between a firms’ trading
flow and their response function than suggested by
the relatively simple model of Eq. (16). Evidence
of this more intricate connection can be found in the
relationship between the instantaneous impact of a
firm’s trades and their order-flow correlation. As can
be seen in Fig. 7b), the longer the order flow is corre-
lated in time, the smaller the instantaneous impact is.
A possible explanation of this is that market partici-
pants tend to minimize the total market impact of a
hidden order either by (i) placing mostly short hidden
orders (and then having short correlated order flows)
and not taking into account instantaneous market im-
pact (and thus incurring largeRi(0)) or, (ii) the other
way around, placing mostly long hidden order (result-
ing in order flows with long-range correlation), but
only trading when instantaneous market impact is
guaranteed to be very small. Note that this explana-
tion implies that in this latter case some participants
only trade when liquidity is large enough while in the
former case those participants might trade even un-
der low liquidity conditions and thus having larger
Ri(0). Therefore, if different participants use dif-
ferent liquidity strategies we might expect that the
market responds differently to market orders of dif-
ferent participants, and as a consequence the bare
response, G0(l), might not be universal for all firms.
On the other hand one should also keep in mind that,
as was shown in [11, 24], the response to and correla-
tion of market orders can be different from the ones
of limit orders. In our model (13) we are only con-
sidering market orders, and find that the model does
not do well in reproducing the behaviors of individ-
ual firms based on the assumption of a single G0(l).
When limit orders are taken into account explicitly
this picture might potentially change.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have calculated individual price impact func-
tions for active firms trading on the Spanish Stock
Market, and observe that they differ significantly
from each other and from the impact function of the
market. We find that this heterogeneity cannot be
explained by random sampling from the global price
impact function of the market. Fitting individual-
level impact functions to power laws of the form
∆i(V ) = ciV
αi we find a negative correlation be-
tween the exponent, αi, and the overall scale of the
impact, ci. This relationship results from a maxi-
9mum acceptable impact for trades of large volumes,
applicable to all firms. We find evidence that the
functional form of the market impact function (i.e.
the pair {αM , cM}) is not a universal property across
markets and stocks, set by the manner in which a
particular market is run. Instead our results suggest
that the global market impact function is to be inter-
preted as a weighted convolution of individual-level
market impact functions, emerging through complex
interaction of the pool of individual trading strategies
operating on the market.
We have also considered response functions, both
on the level of the market as a whole, and for in-
dividual market members. Individual-level response
functions are obtained by conditioning measurements
on transactions triggered by a particular firm. As
for instantaneous impact, individual-level response
functions are found to be different from the response
function of the whole market. Consequently we have
explored whether existing models of global market
response can be extended to the level of individual
market members. In the literature response func-
tions have for example been modeled using a lin-
ear relation between trades and prices [6]. Assuming
that the price impact of a single transation is prop-
agated in time according to a kernel G0(·), known
as the ‘bare impact function’, this linear model con-
nects market-level response and correlation, and has
been found to be successful to reconcile the appar-
ent paradox of long-correlated order flows and un-
predictable price movements. We found that indeed
the same market-level result applies to the Spanish
Stock Market. However, assuming the existence of a
global kernel G0(·) propagating the impacts of trades
by any firm uniformly, and applying the theory on
the level of single firms we find that the resulting
model fares less well in connecting individual-level
response and correlation functions, suggesting that
there is no universal bare impact function applying
equally to all traders. In particular our data indicates
that the more correlated the order flow of an individ-
ual is, the smaller their response function becomes – a
somewhat counterintuitive result. This suggests that
while the simple model derived from the assumptions
of Bouchaud et al [6] is sufficient to solve the above
paradox at the level of the whole market, a more de-
tailed model is required to describe market impact
at the level of individual firms in the dataset that we
have studied. Several remarks are here in order: first,
our database contains information only about market
orders, and so our analysis is restricted to this type of
trades. However, limit orders and/or cancelation of
orders might be also important to understand mar-
ket impact and the response functions both on the
global and on the individual level [11, 24]. Secondly,
it might be possible that the linearity of the model of
Eq. (13) is too large a restriction to reproduce real
price formation, as suggested in [25]. It may therefore
be necessary to use more general non-linear models
and/or models that include variables other than the
volume and the sign of the orders. Finally, another
possible important effect in market impact could lie
in the correlation between the behaviour of market
participants. As reported in [8], trading strategies of
different participants are correlated, while the model
of Eqs. (13) and (16) assumes that individual re-
sponse function are independent of the rest of the
participants’ trades.
There is now a growing body of work investigat-
ing features of financial markets on a scale finer than
that of the whole market. Such work includes stud-
ies of aggregates of individual actions as in [11] and
firm-by-firm analyses such as [12]. We have shown
that there exists a remarkable range of different be-
haviours at the level of firms. Similar results have
recently been discovered for liquidity provision and
price response in [11] (using a notably different form
of response function to the one discussed in this pa-
per). Our results indicate that the observed behavior
at the level of the market can be seen as a convoluted
and weighted average of the heterogeneous behavior
of the firms participating in it. Thus, the origin of
the scattered values of the different exponents found
in the microstructure properties and functions across
different markets (quantities such as αM , γM , βM )
may have their roots in the different composition of
market participants at different market places, and
in the nature of the strategies of market members.
This is in sharp contrast with theoretical models sug-
gesting universal values (e.g. the ‘square-root law’)
for market impact functions based on homogeneous
behavior of market participants [26, 27, 29, 31, 32].
It is our hope that our work will help to inform and
to evolve models which include heterogeneity in price
impact, to understand how such models operate on
the market level [1], and to encourage further investi-
gations into the relationship between individual and
market behaviour in other areas.
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Appendix A: Data processing
This section outlines the processing procedure used
on the data. It involves looking for instances where
a firm triggers multiple trades of the same sign, at
the same time stamp. In our dataset (real) time is
resolved up to the accuracy of seconds, so that this
applies to trades triggered in the same second. An ex-
ample of such an occurrence in the data is shown in
Table. II. The data shows three buy orders triggered
Sec IDbuy IDsell ε no. Shares Price qb qa
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2777 9403 9821 1 100 17.25 7.454 7.455
2777 9403 9575 1 150 17.25 7.454 7.455
2777 9403 9813 1 50 17.25 7.454 7.455
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
TABLE II: A table showing an extract of the unprocessed
data. Irrelevant fields have been excluded for simplicity.
by the same firm, 9403, for 100, 150 and 50 shares.
The quotes before and after each trade are the same
because these are only calculated at the end of each
second. Therefore, these lines of data should not each
by considered as separate trades each with the same
impact. This data actually represents firm 9403 plac-
ing a market order for 300 shares which happens to
be filled by opposing limit orders from three different
firms. This trade should be represented as shown in
Table. III.
This procedure is repeated for all data sets. Note
that it is no longer sensible to include information
about who filled the opposite side of an order since
this may be more than one firm. The processed data
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Sec IDtrigger ε no. Shares Price qb qa
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2777 9403 1 300 17.25 7.454 7.455
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
TABLE III: A table showing the result of applying the
processing procedure to the extract in Table. II.
therefore only includes the ID of the firm which trig-
gered the transaction. As mentioned in Sec. III, not
performing this processing results in the attribution
of impacts resulting from one larger volume trade to
multiple trades of smaller volumes.
It is interesting to note that the global impact func-
tion calculated from the raw data, i.e. without the
processing just explained, can be fitted to a power law
with an exponent of αM ≈ 0.12 for all stocks together,
significantly lower than the exponent of αM = 0.28
obtained from the processed data.
